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GOOD MORAL CHARACTER:
ALREADY AN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
CONCEPT AND NOW PUTTING BAR APPLICANTS IN A
POST-9/11 WORLD ON AN ELEVATED THREAT LEVEL
Theresa Keeley
A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is
unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to obtain that goal. It is also
important both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-
free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar.
-Justice Hugo Black'
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2002, when I was considering engaging in civil dis-
obedience to protest war against Iraq, I asked a constitutional law
professor if an arrest would affect my bar application. He said it de-
pended on the state; there was no clear answer. This bothered me, as
I had foregone participating in the Republican National Convention
protests in 2000 because an attorney warned me that it might jeop-
ardize my chances of being admitted to the bar.2
By the time I appear before the character and fitness committee
of the state bar, I will have invested three years of hard work and ac-
cumulated a debt of over $100,000 to become an attorney. There-
fore, I am uncomfortable with the notion that I must choose between
my future law career and exercising my First Amendment right of
free expression.3 It is also troubling to know I may have already jeop-
ardized my chances of admission to the bar on the basis of activities I
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Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (Black, J.) ("Konigsberg]).
Before that time, I had engaged in civil disobedience, but had never been arrested.
3 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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engaged in before coming to law school. Even if the committee does
admit me, the possibility of being denied admission has already had a
negative impact simply because I have not engaged in certain activi-
ties. It seems odd that I could spend my career representing those
who engage in civil disobedience, while I am unable to do so myself
now or that I might lose some of my First Amendment rights because
I am going to be a lawyer.4
Some argue that what a bar admissions committee can and cannot
do when deciding to admit an applicant is clear. They argue that
there is no controversy, as the Supreme Court decided the issue in
three cases in 1971. The committee can deny admission on the basis
of "bad character," but not an applicant's political views. Further-
more, if all else fails, the applicant can appeal to the state, and ulti-
mately to the Supreme Court for redress. However, if these argu-
ments are accurate, it seems strange that my professor could not
answer my question.
I disagree that bar admission is a "comfortable" area of First
Amendment law, especially in the post-9/11 world, nor do I believe
the answer to this dilemma is conclusive. Part I of this Comment in-
troduces the character and fitness committee and the elusive concept
of "good moral character." Part II examines cases before 1971 that,
by and large, rejected the notion of an applicant's right to refuse to
5answer questions regarding his possible "Communist" associations.
Part III introduces the 1971 cases-Baird,6 Stolar,7 and Wadmond-
and their failure to overturn the earlier "Communist" cases outright.
Part IV explores how the 1971 cases provide no guidance for charac-
ter and fitness committees or prospective applicants because they
contradict one another. Additionally, Part IV illustrates how state
courts have been inconsistent when attempting to follow these deci-
sions. Part V discusses the fact that the 1971 cases decided little more
than the facts presented and were sensitive to the popular ideas of
4 Some might argue that lawyers cannot commit murder, but can defend those accused of
committing the crime. In my opinion, civil disobedience is different than murder because al-
though one breaks the law, it is deliberately done to send a higher political message and it is
nonviolent.
5 I use the pronouns "he" and "his" because the pre-1971 cases all concerned men.
6 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) ("[W]e hold that views and beliefs are im-
mune from bar association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant
from the practice of law.").
In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971) (deciding that it is a violation of a bar applicant's First
Amendment rights to deny him admission solely because of the applicant's refusal to answer
questions about his beliefs and associations).
a Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (hold-
ing that the New York Bar's admission requirements do not have a "chilling effect" upon the
exercise of free speech and association of law students and that legislatures, not courts, are re-
sponsible for broad admissions policy changes).
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the time in which they were made. Ultimately, they protected only
applicants who held theoretical political views, not ones who had en-
gaged in activities supporting those views. Part VI explores how the
climate today, post-9/11, could alter character and fitness comittee's
definitions of "good moral character." Part VII highlights how the
Supreme Court's tendency to favor states over applicants' First
Amendment rights poses a greater danger in a post-9/11 world. Fi-
nally, this Comment concludes that the repercussions of denying ad-
mission to state bars because of an applicant's exercise of First
Amendment rights affects not only the applicant but all those who
may need representation.
I. THE BAR ADMISSIONS PROCESS AND GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
Rather than having a national standard, admission to the bar is a
state process, with each state deciding whom it wishes to admit. This
procedure is both a blessing and a curse to prospective applicants.
While the state-by-state system permits one who is denied admission
in one state to then apply to another, such procedures allow state bar
admission committees to reflect local prejudices and viewpoints. De-
spite some support for replacing the current system with a national
law license, in August of 2002, the American Bar Association's House
of Delegates rejected the idea.9
From its inception, the bar admissions process has been fueled by
the desire to maintain a certain image of the legal profession and
lawyers. The admissions process began in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century as other professions began to take an interest
in character certification."° According to Lawrence M. Friedman, the
desire for a more formal process was motivated by the desires to "up-
grade the profession,... control the supply of lawyers, and keep out
price cutters and undesirables."" However, Deborah L. Rhode sug-
gests a more sinister motive: "Much of the initial impetus for more
stringent character scrutiny arose in response to an influx of Eastern
European immigrants, which threatened the profession's public
standing. Nativist and ethnic prejudices during the 1920's, coupled
with economic pressures during the Depression, fueled a renewed
drive for entry barriers."0
2
For admission purposes, the applicant must prove to a state char-
acter and fitness committee that she possesses "good moral charac-
9 Patricia Manson, ABA Rejects National Law License, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 13, 2002, West-
law, 8/13/02 CHIDLB 1.
10 Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 498-99
(1985).
11 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 654 (2d ed. 1985).
12 Rhode, supra note 10, at 499-500.
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ter." Although most states define what constitutes "good moral char-
acter," as Marcus Ratcliff explains, it can include everything from
"honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, reliability, respect for the law, in-
tegrity, candor, discretion, observance of fiduciary duty, respect for
the rights of others, fiscal responsibility, physical ability to practice
law, knowledge of the law, mental and emotional stability, and a
commitment to the judicial process."" This shadowy concept lies
against the backdrop of a process that historically excluded women,
minorities, and more recently, lesbians and gays. 4
II. THE "COMMUNIST" CASES: PRE-1971
Although the Supreme Court addressed the subject of bar admis-
sions in a trilogy of cases in 1971, its four earlier decisions in 1957
and 1961 are still significant because they have not been expressly
overruled.5 Moreover, by detailing and thereby concentrating on the
individual's particular circumstances, the Court never articulated a
broad principle to guide later committees, courts, or future appli-
cants. Finally, these cases demonstrate the extent to which the politi-
cal climate of the time can influence character and fitness commit-
tees. The decisions are particularly relevant today at a time when the
United States fears attacks perpetrated from within the country itself,
similar to the fear of Communists.
On two days, one in 1957, and another in 1961, the Supreme
Court decided four cases, Schware and Konigsberg (1957) and Konigs-
berg and Anastaplo (1961).6 All four cases concern how an applicant's
association or refusal to answer questions regarding his possible asso-
ciations with the Communist Party reflected upon his good moral
character.
13 Marcus Ratcliff, Note, The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for a Uniform National
Standard, 36 TULSA L.J. 487, 495 (2000) ("However, at least seventeen states avoid the problems
involved in describing the relevant character traits that make up good character by not publish-
ing guidelines.").
14 Joel Jay Finer, Gay and Lesbian Applicants to the Bar: Even Lord Devlin Could Not Defend Exclu-
sion, Circa 2000, 10 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 231 (2001) (analyzing how societal attitudes and laws
toward lesbians and gays have shifted in a positive way since the 1960s, but that lesbian and gay
applicants to the bar could still face potential risks in overcoming the "good moral character"
standard); see also Jon Bauer, The Character of the Questions and the Fitness of the Process: Mental
Health, Bar Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 UCLA L. REV. 93 (2001) (analyz-
ing the rejection of applicants for mental and physical disabilities including depression and sub-
stance abuse in light of the ADA).
15 "Neither [Anastaplo or Konigsberg] is now expressly overruled." Baird v. State Bar of Ariz.,
401 U.S. 1, 12 (1971) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
16 The Supreme Court heard one applicant's case twice-Konigsberg.
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A. Schware
In 1957, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, the Su-
preme Court unanimously reversed New Mexico's denial of Rudolph
Schware's application to sit for the bar exam. 7 Schware had served in
the Army,8 used an alias during his efforts to unionize Italian workers
because he feared anti-Semitism,'9 and encouraged others tojoin the
Loyalist government in the Spanish Civil War. However, the com-
mittee denied his application after it confidentially learned of his
previous Communist Party ties, even though it had never asked
Schware about them." The New Mexico Supreme Court supported
the denial, emphasizing that Schware's membership was for a period
of six to seven years during his adulthood, which indicated he was "a
person of questionable character.
22
In evaluating Schware's procedural due process claim, 3 the Su-
preme Court concentrated on the facts surrounding his past Com-
munist Party ties rather than the "secret evidence" aspect of his
claim. 4 Ultimately, the Court "forgave" Schware because he re-
nounced the party and, at the time of his involvement, the party was
legal.2 5 Notably, the Court stressed that while Schware believed in the
principles of the Communist Party, he did not act,16 and that
"[a]pparently many thousands of other Americans joined him in this
step.
The Court noted that a "[s] tate cannot exclude an applicant when
there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these stan-
dards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. "2 However,
read in the context of the entire decision, this statement suggests that
because there was no other indication of lack of good moral charac-
ter on Schware's part, the committee's action was discriminatory.
Otherwise, the denial would have been upheld.
Although helpful to Schware, the Court's decision provides little
guidance to future applicants because it is too specific to Schware's
17 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
18 Id. at 237.
19 Id. at 236.
20 Id. at 237.
21 Id. at 235.
22 Id. at 244.
23 Id. at 233.
24 Although the committee also refused to provide Schware with the information confiden-
tially gained, the Supreme Court did not address that issue. Id. at 235 n.2.
25 Id. at 244.
26 "There is nothing in the record that gives any indication that his association with that
Party was anything more than a political faith in a political party." Id.
27 Id. at 245.
28 Id. at 239.
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own circumstances and, more significantly, because the standard the
Court articulates is vague. The Court held that past membership in
an organization is not enough to disqualify an applicant from the bar.
While the Court found that "any qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law," it
also conceded that it was within the state's power to require a "high
standard" of qualification for admission. 29 This implies that bar ad-
mission is subject to rational basis review: as long as the committee
can justify a reason for its denial, it is constitutional. However, an
applicant's exercise of his First Amendment rights should be ac-
corded more protection.
B. Konigsberg I and II
The same day it decided Schware, the Supreme Court remanded
the California State Committee of Bar Examiners' refusal to certify
Raphael Konigsberg for admission to the bar30 because he failed to
"dispel substantial doubts.., about his character and loyalty.""1 The
committee heard evidence that Konigsberg attended Communist
Party meetings in 1941.2 Although Konigsberg refused to elaborate
on his political views or indicate whether or not he was or ever had
been a member of the Communist Party,3 3 he did answer questions
about his other associations and stated that he was not a Communist
in a "philosophical sense. 34 He also provided the written testimony
of forty-two individuals who knew him over the course of twenty years
and attested to his "excellent character."
35
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Black, the Court remanded
the case because there was "no evidence.., which rationally justi-
fie[d] a finding that Konigsberg failed to establish his good moral
character or failed to show that he did not advocate forceful over-
throw of the Government. 36 The Court noted that even if it were
true that Konigsberg was a Communist, the party was legal in Califor-
nia in 1941 .37 " [T] he mere fact of membership would not support an
inference that he did not have good moral character."38 Without evi-
dence of unlawful actions on Konigsberg's part, the committee could
2 Id.
30 Konigsberg1, 353 U.S. 252, 253, 274 (1957).
31 Id. at 261 n.15.
32 Id. at 266.
33 Id. at 258.
34 Id. at 267.
35 Id. at 264.
36 Id. at 273.
37 Id. at 268.
38 Id. at 267.
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not assume that he "presently advocates overthrowing the Govern-
ment by force. 39
In front of the committee on remand, Konigsberg introduced fur-
ther evidence as to his good moral character (none of which was re-
butted), reiterated unequivocally that he did not believe in violent
overthrow of the government, and stated that he had never know-
ingly been a member of an "organization which advocated such ac-
tion[s]." 4° Significantly, however, he continued to refuse to answer
questions regarding his possible Communist Party ties on First
Amendment grounds.4' The committee again denied his applica-
41tion.
In 1961, the Supreme Court considered whether Konigsberg's re-
fusals to answer could be grounds for a denial because he failed to
carry his burden of proof.4 The committee claimed that by his refus-
als, Konigsberg denied the committee the opportunity to investigate
further and determine if there even was a problem with his applica-
tion.44 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that by not answering ques-
tions that a committee deems to have "substantial relevance to his
qualifications," Konigsberg obstructed an investigation, providing
adequate grounds for denial.45 As the Court noted, membership in
the Communist Party is a danger and therefore, an area of substantial
relevance."
Both Rudolph Schware and Raphael Konigsberg were accused of
previous membership in the Communist Party when it was legal.
However, Schware's willingness to distance himself from it legitimized
his application to the state bar and he was granted admission, while
Konigsberg's refusal to explicitly confirm or deny it provided ade-
quate grounds for his denial.
C. Anastaplo
In a companion opinion to Konigsberg II, the Court considered the
denial of George Anastaplo on the basis of his "abstract belief in the
39 Id. at 271.
40 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 39 (1961) ("KonigsbergllT).
41 Id.
4 Id.
43 Id. at 42-43.
44 Id. at 43.
45 Id. at 44.
46 Id. at 52. "This Court has long since recognized the legitimacy of a statutory finding that
membership in the Communist Party is not unrelated to the danger of use for such illegal ends
of powers given for limited purposes." Id.
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'right of revolution"' as well as his refusal to answer questions about
his associations.47
Anastaplo's application first caught the Illinois Committee on
Character and Fitness's eye because he wrote an essay "defending the
right to revolution as articulated in the Declaration of Independ-
ence."4' When questioned further about when such a right to revolu-
tion might exist, he detailed situations such as "Nazi Germany; Hun-
gry during the 1956 revolt against Russia; [or] a hypothetical decree
of [the Supreme] Court establishing 'some dead pagan religion as
the official religion of the country."' Significantly, Anastaplo stated
that he could not think of "such a single instance" in United States
history, but he believed "it [was] important to insist that there might
be such instances." ° In addition, Anastaplo refused to disclose his
possible associations not only with the Communist Party or any other
"subversive" organization, including the Ku Klux Klan, but also with
political groups, such as the Democratic and Republican parties.
The Court rejected the claim that Anastaplo's denial was "arbi-
trary or discriminatory."52 Instead, the Court found that Anastaplo's
petition was rejected because of his "refusal to cooperate in the
Committee's examination. The Court opined that once Anastaplo
answered the committee's questions, his application would no longer
be denied.5 4
What is most troubling about Anastaplo's denial is that the com-
mittee rejected him solely on the theoretical basis of his beliefs, as
there was no evidence that Anastaplo had acted on those beliefs.5 Al-
though he articulated a belief in the right of the people to revolt, it
was theoretical. Most importantly, when discussing his obligations as
a lawyer, Anastaplo explained that he would not advise a client to re-
sist a decision by force, but only "'with respect to the legal system as it
e x ists . '"56
47 In reAnastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 83-85 (1961). After passing the Illinois Bar, the Illinois Char-
acter and Fitness Committee rejected Anastaplo for refusing to answer questions about possible
Communist Party associations. He appealed, but the Supreme Court refused to review his case.
After the Supreme Court's Konigsberg and Schware decisions, Anastaplo sought a rehearing. See
In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d 429, 429-31 (11. 1959) (holding that bar applicant's denial of
admission on the basis that the applicant failed to establish good moral character denied appli-
cant his due process rights).
48 Rhode, supra note 10, at 569.
49 In reAnastaplo, 366 U.S. at 96 n.18.
5 Id.
51 Id. at 85 n.5.
52 Id. at 94.
53 Id. at 96.
5 Id.
55 Id. at 98 (Black, J., dissenting). Nothing in Anastaplo's record indicated a problem that
.could have, in any way, cast doubt upon his fitness for admission to the Bar." Id.
In reAnastaplo, 163 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ill. 1959) (quoting Anastaplo's testimony).
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Overall, the pre-1971 cases indicate that a bar committee must
have a rational basis for denying membership or refusing to certify.
Schware states that past membership in a legal organization is not
enough for a denial. However, Konigsberg implies that past member-
ship in a legal organization is grounds for denial if a candidate does
not disavow his prior acts or does not answer allegations of member-
ship. Additionally, refusing to answer the committee's questions
about membership in the Communist Party in particular or a blanket
refusal in general, as in George Anastaplo's case, serves as a basis for
denial.
III. THE 1971 TRILOGY
On February 23, 1971, the Supreme Court inconsistently decided
multiple bar admissions cases-Baird, Stolar, and Wadmond. In plural-
ity decisions, the Court reversed the denials of individuals, Sara Baird
and Martin Stolar, while in Wadmond, it upheld a class challenge to
New York's questions regarding group associations. In doing so, the
Court established that challenges to the bar admission process would
be decided ad hoc, rather than according to bright-line rules.
A. Baird
The Arizona Bar Committee refused to process Sara Baird's appli-
cation because she declined to answer whether she had been a mem-
ber of the Communist Party or another organization that advocated
violent overthrow of the government. She did, however, provide an
extensive list of all the organizations she had been a member of since
the age of sixteen, including: the Girl Scouts, the Young Republi-
cans, the Younj Democrats, and the Law Students Civil Rights Re-
search Council. She then appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court,
asking that the bar committee show cause for its denial, which the
court denied . In a plurality decision, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the denial. 0
At times the Court used sweeping language about the importance
of protecting the applicant's First Amendment rights. However, the
Court implied that Arizona was sweeping too broadly only because
there was no other evidence of a "problem" with Sara Baird's applica-
tion. As the Court stated:
57 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1971).
58 Id. at 7 n.7.
9 Id. at 5.
60 Id. at 8.
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But here petitioner has already supplied the Committee with extensive
personal and professional information to assist its determination....
And whatever justification may be offered, a State may not inquire about
a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right
or benefit because of what he believes.
In this way, Baird only protects the applicant who specifically refuses
to answer questions about the Communist Party but reveals all other
associations to a state character and fitness committee.
In reversing her denial, the Supreme Court adopted an approach
similar to the one it took in Schware it considered the committee's
denial in the context of the rest of Baird's application and evaluated
whether the committee had legitimate grounds. The Court noted
that there was no indication Baird failed to disclose any organization
to which she had belonged 62 or that there was anything that remotely
suggested her views might be a problem for the committee. As the
Court described: "This record is wholly barren of one word, sen-
tence, or paragraph that tends to show this lady is not morally and
professionally fit to serve honorably and well as a member of the legal
profession.
B. Stolar
Similarly, Ohio refused to allow Martin Stolar to sit for the bar ex-
amination after he refused to answer detailed questions about his as-
sociations.6 Although at oral interrogation before the committee
Stolar answered that he was not, nor had he been, a member of the
Communist Party.65 During the written portion, he refused to answer
the following:
12. State whether you have been, or presently are... (g) a member of
any organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of
the United States by force ....
13. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of
which you are or have been a member.
61 Id. at 7.
62 Id. at 4.
63 Id. at 8. Considering the fact that the Court made specific reference to Ms. Baird's gender
through the use of "lady," it is unclear whether or not Ms. Baird's gender played any role in the
decision. In the course of my research, Baird is the only Supreme Court case involving a woman
whose application to the bar had been denied for her political views or refusal to answer ques-
tions regarding them. The Court also said, "In effect this young lady was asked by the State to
make a guess as to whether any organization to which she ever belonged 'advocates overthrow
of the United States Government by force or violence,'" a comment that has patronizing under-
tones. Id. at 5.
InreStolar, 401 U.S. 23, 26 (1971).
65 Id.
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7. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of66which you are or have been a member since registering as a law student.
Stolar cited infringement of his First and Fifth Amendment rights
as the grounds for his refusal . Additionally, Stolar, already a mem-
ber of the New York Bar, provided the committee with his New York
application.68 The New York information listed his organizational as-
sociations such as the Boy Scouts, activities with his local temple, and
VISTA . It also indicated that when joining the Army, Stolar signed
the standard U.S. Army pre-induction security oath.7 0 Finally, Stolar
answered "yes" to the question: "Can you conscientiously, and do
you, affirm, without any mental reservation, that you have been and
are loyal to the Government of the United States?"'
Stolar provides some First Amendment protections to future bar
applicants because it limited the kinds of associational questions the
state can ask and recognized the potential negative effect on Free
Expression rights. The Court held that Ohio's questions that re-
quired Stolar to first list the organizations of which he had been a
member since the age of sixteen and since joining law school were
too broad.2 Most significantly, the Court acknowledged that bar ad-
mission questions could chill the First Amendment rights of appli-
cants: "Law students who know they must survive this screening
process before practicing their profession are encouraged to protect
their future by shunning unpopular or controversial organizations."
t
Nevertheless, Stolar does not overrule Anastapl, instead, it carves
out an exception for Martin Stolar. Like George Anastaplo, Martin
Stolar refused to answer questions about his associations in his appli-
cation. The Ohio committee argued that the associational informa-
tion was needed to assess an applicant's character. Although ac-
knowledging the state's need, the Court found the question
irrelevant because Martin Stolar was a member in good standing of
the New York Bar and because his New York application provided
substantially the same information Ohio was seeking. Furthermore,
there were no problems or questionable activities in Stolar's applica-
tion. 6 Therefore, like Baird and Schware, Stolar was protected from
6 Id. at 27.
67 Id.
6 Id. at 26.
6 Id. at 25-26.
70 Id. at 26.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 27-28.
73 Id. at 28.
74 Id. at 29.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 30. "There is not one word in this entire record that reflects adversely on Mr. Sto-
lar's moral character or his professional competence." Id.
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the committee's inquiries because his only "mistake" was not answer-
ing questions to which he had already provided answers. As in Baird,
the Court elevated procedure over protection of an individual's right
to free expression.
C. Wadmond
Unlike Baird and Stolar, in Law Students Civil Rights Research Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Wadmond, a class of individuals and organizations represent-
ing future applicants to the New York Bar challenged its admissions
procedures, namely Question 26 as chilling their First Amendment
rights.
77 In a plurality decision, the Court upheld the procedure.
78
In Question 26, New York first asked the applicant about member-
ship in various groups and, then, whether the individual shared the
group's illegal intent, splitting the Scales requirement.79 The Court
upheld the question, claiming it promoted efficiency by limiting the
number of applicants the committee must investigate further."0 Reaf-
firming Konigsberg, the Court stated: "It is also well settled that Bar
examiners may ask about Communist affiliations as a preliminary to
further inquiry into the nature of the association and may exclude an
applicant for refusal to answer.,81
Ultimately, the Court refused to issue blanket First Amendment
protections to applicants because the application was only facially,
and not effectually, invalid. As the Court explained: "[T]here has
been no showing that any applicant for admission to the New York
Bar has been denied admission either because of his answers to these
7 401 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1971). The plaintiffs also objected to New York's requirement that
an applicant assert her belief and loyalty to the form of the United States government, which
the majority upheld. Id. at 161-64.
78 Id. at 167.
Scales v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (requiring that an individual must not only be a
member of an organization that advocates violent overthrow of the government, but also must
be aware of these aims and share the group's intent).
Question 26 asks:
26. (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any
organization or group of persons which, during the period of your membership or asso-
ciation, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United States
or any state or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by
force, violence, or any unlawful means? __ If your answer is in the affirmative, state
the facts below.
(b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such
membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organiza-
tion or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States
or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence or any unlawful means?
Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 164-65.
80 Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 164-65.
81 Id.
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or any similar questions, or because of his refusal to answer them. 8 2
In this way, the Court reinforced the notion that every single appli-
cant must litigate and that different standards can apply to each indi-
vidual. If every decision depends on an actual denial, this assumes
the only harm is the denial of admission, ignoring the chilling effects
on speech. In responding to the plaintiff's argument that "constitu-
tional deprivations will be inevitable, 8 3 the Court stressed the state's
entitlement to have some kind of screening process and its decision,
not the Court's, to decide what it will be.84
IV. THE 1971 TRILOGY'S INCONSISTENCIES FOSTER
CONFLICTING STATE INTERPRETATIONS
Read together, Baird and Stolar, as compared to Wadmond, raise
serious inconsistencies, most notably, regarding what kinds of ques-
tions a committee can ask and how it can treat the refusal to answer
questions. For example, in Stolar, the Court held that "Ohio may not
require an applicant for admission to the Bar to state whether he has
been or is a 'member of any organization which advocates the over-
throw of the government of the United States by force."'85 Yet in
Wadmond, the Court allowed New York to ask a nearly identical ques-
tion.86 This suggests the Ohio question was too broad because it "re-
lated only to ... beliefs and associations,"8 7 while Wadmonds question
is permissible because the second part inquires if the applicant shares
those intentions. In the same way, Justice Stewart notes in his con-
currence in Baird that mere membership is not grounds for rejection,
only "knowing membership" is.M However, under Scales, an individ-
ual not only must be a member of an organization that advocates vio-
lent overthrow of the government, but also must be aware of these
aims and share the group's intent.89 Therefore, allowing the prelimi-
nary question, as in Wadmond, ignores the Scales standard altogether
and provides fewer First Amendment protections to bar applicants.
Furthermore, the denial on the basis of a refusal to answer ques-
tions is not applied in a content-neutral manner; rather, it depends
upon what other kinds of information the applicant has provided.
Wadmond holds that a committee can properly deny an applicant for
her refusal to answer questions regarding possible Communist asso-
82 Id. at 165.
83 Id. at 167.
84 Id.
85 In reStolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971).
86 See supra note 79; Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 164-65.
87 Stolar, 401 U.S. at 30.
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 9 (1971) (StewartJ., concurring in thejudgment).
89 Scales v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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ciations. Under this rule, Sara Baird's denial should have been up-
held. Instead, taking Wadmond and its two companion cases together,
it seems more likely that the Court is saying that an applicant can be
denied only if there is some other evidence of a problem. Most nota-
bly, applicants like Sara Baird or Martin Stolar are protected against
broad sweeping inquiries because they provided extensive personal
information and nothing else indicated a problem with their records.
By contrast, Raphael Konigsberg refused to answer questions about
his Communist Party ties even after a woman accused him of attend-
ing Communist Party meetings. George Anastaplo declined to give
information about any of his associations which added to suspicions
the committee already had after reading his writings regarding the
right to revolution. In this way, only uncontroversial candidates are
afforded protection. 90
The contradictions in the 1971 cases has led to divergent state
court interpretations. For example, West Virginia relied on Baird and
Stolar to reverse a denial while New York used Wadmond to reject a
challenge to application questions.
A. Pushinsky
In 1980, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the
committee's refusal to process Jon Pushinsky's application for admis-
sion to the state bar, .relying primarily on Baird and Stolar.91 The
committee refused to process his application because he marked
"Decline to Answer," assuming this choice recognized his First
Amendment right9 in response to the following:
21. Do you advocate or knowingly belong to an organization or group
which advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States of
America or of the State of West Virginia by force or violence?
Yes No Decline to Answer
93
When Pushinsky's admission to the bar was subsequently delayed, he
met with the board. At this meeting, he confirmed that he intended
to mark "Decline to Answer" and would continue to respond to the
question in that manner.94 The committee then sent a letter asking
Pushinsky if he advocated overthrow of the government of the United
States or of West Virginia by force or violence and, secondly, if he
90 See Baird, 401 U.S. at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[Ulnder some circum-
stances simple inquiry into present or past Communist Party membership of an applicant for
admission to the Bar is not as such unconstitutional.").
91 Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 266 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1980).
9 Id. at 446 & n.4.
93 Id. at 445.
94 Id.
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"knowingly" belonged to "any organization or group" which advo-
cated that idea.5 Pushinsky initiated suit, alleging the inquiries and
the committee's refusal to process his application abridged his First
Amendment rights.96 He did, however, state his willingness to answer
all other inquiries.97
In response, the committee said it denied Pushinsky processing
because he refused to answer the question, not because of his beliefs,
echoing the argument in Konigsberg." The court sided with Pushinsky,
pointing out that "Decline to Answer" was an available response.
Relying on Wadmond, the committee also argued that reading the two
questions in conjunction with one another solved the constitutional
problem because it transformed the second question into one of
"personal advocacy" rather than association.'00 The court, however,
held both questions unconstitutional. Citing Baird and Stolar, the
court dismissed the first question as "fatally overbroad" because it
embraced all forms of advocacy.01 Further, it distinguished Wadmond
on the ground that it asked about the applicant's specific intent to fur-
ther the illegal aims of the group, rather than whether or not the ap-
plicant was simply aware that the group held those aims, as the West
Virginia question did. 0 2 As with Rudolph Schware, Sara Baird, and
Martin Stolar, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted
that the committee made no allegation that Pushinsky had "ever en-
gaged in activity or associations which involved advocating the violent
overthrow of the government."'
Most importantly, the court described the questions as "outdated"
and not helpful in adding any perspective to an applicant's ability to
practice law, but merely provided a "reason for [the committee] to
withhold a license to practice law."
0 4
95 Id. at 445-46.
96 Id. at 446.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. Although the Court reversed the committee's decision, it hinted that if the committee
had proved that it needed Pushinsky's answers in order to assess his moral character, the situa-
tion might have been different. See id. at 451 (noting that the committee would have to show
that the question was necessary to protect a legitimate state interest under Baird, the court then
stated that the committee had failed to show that they needed Pushinsky's answers to assess his
character, implying that such a showing would have overcome the Baird requirement).
100 Id. at 448.
"01 Id. at 447-48.
102 See id. at 449 (focusing on the conclusory role played by the West Virginia Bar).
103 Id. at 446 n.3.




New York's Character and Fitness Committee treated Colin A.
Fieman similarly. After applying to the New York Bar in 1991, Colin
A. Fieman's application was "delayed" for processing because he re-
fused to answer Question 21, believing it violated his First Amend-
ment rights. That question stated:
Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of
any organization or group of persons which, during the period of your
membership or association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the
government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision
thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any
unlawful means? If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts be-
low.
105
Fieman refused to answer because the question makes no refer-
ence to specific intent; rather, it simply focuses on membership and
knowing the aims of the group. As he explains: "It was impossible
for me to reconcile the purpose of the Character Committees' inves-
tigation, and my own responsibilities as a prospective attorney ....
[A] nswering ... would mean that from the outset of my legal career I
was willing to tolerate without protest unconstitutional state action.',
0 6
In declining to answer, Fieman listed Supreme Court cases support-
ing his position on his application. 7
The committee held Fieman's application in limbo. First, it sent
his application without a recommendation to the appellate division
for a ruling on the constitutional issues Fieman raised.'08 After six
months the court sent the application back to the committee, without
a decision.'9 After another six weeks, the committee made a favor-
able recommendation for admission and sent the application back to
the court, which the appellate court denied with leave to renew."0 In
deciding, the court found Question 21, which was identical to the
first question upheld in Wadmond, to be "proper." It described Fie-
man's refusal to answer as a "willful obstruction of the legitimate
function of the Committees to inquire into an applicant's character
and fitness to practice law,''' a response similar to the Supreme
Court's treatment of Raphael Konigsberg and George Anastaplo.
105 Colin A. Fieman, A Relic of McCarthyism: Question 21 of the Application for Admission to the
New York Bar, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 47, 47-48 (1994).
106 Id. at 50.
1 Id. In his article, however, Fieman does not say which Supreme Court cases he cited as
authority for his refusal.
IN Id.
109 Id. at 50--51.
110 Id. at 51.
III Id.
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Fieman eventually withdrew his appeal, answered the question out
of frustration, and was immediately admitted to the bar."' Techni-
cally, the New York committee neither accepted nor denied Fieman's
application.
Pushinsky and Fieman illustrate how two state courts can rely either
on Baird and Stolar or on Wadmond. The West Virginia Supreme
Court considered Jon Pushinsky's "decline to answer" as a response
and relied mainly on Baird and Stolar, rather than Wadmond, to re-
verse the denial. In doing so, the court valued Pushinsky's First
Amendment rights. On the other hand, New York denied Fieman af-
ter holding his application in limbo for over seven months. Future
character and fitness committees could follow New York's lead and
avoid constitutional issues simply through delay.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S BAR ADMISSIONS DECISIONS REFLECT
SOCIETY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPLICANT'S VIEWS
The Supreme Court's bar admissions decisions reflect society's ac-
ceptance of the applicant's views. In both Baird and Stolar, the Court
recognized that the earlier 1957 and 1961 decisions were sensitive to
the time period in which they were made. For example, in Baird the
Court remarked: "This has been an increasingly divisive and bitter
issue for some years, especially since Senator Joseph McCarthy from
Wisconsin stirred up anti-Communist feelings and fears by his 'inves-
tigations' in the early 1950's."" 4 In Stolar it noted: "These cases
[Baird and Stolar], which concern inquisitions about loyalty and gov-
ernment overthrow, are relics of a turbulent period known as the
'McCarthy era,' which drew its name from Senator Joseph McCarthy
from Wisconsin.""5 The influence of popular sentiment on bar ad-
mission is evident in the treatment of Terrence Hallinan and Mat-
thew Hale regarding their views on civil rights and racial equality.
What this means in a post-9/11 world remains to be seen.
A. Hallinan
The California Character and Fitness Committee refused to certify
Terence Hallinan, arguing that his arrests for engaging in civil
112 Id. at 75 (explaining his choice to give up "under the pressure of professional considera-
tions").
"1 Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 266 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1980). The court does
not explain why "decline to answer" was even an option or how Pushinsky's application would
have been treated had it not been an option and he refused to answer.
14 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 3 (1970).
11.5 In reStolar, 401 U.S. 23, 24 (1971).
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disobedience demonstrated bad character. 16 Hallinan was a member
of groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People ("NAACP") and Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee ("SNCC") and had been arrested while organizing voters
in Mississippi."7 In defending his actions, Hallinan stressed the need
to end racial inequality and pointed to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
support. " 8
The Supreme Court of California reversed the denial, sidestep-
ping the civil disobedience issue, and instead emphasized:
[Hallihan's] sentiments on the qualified right of civil disobedience, how-
ever controversial, are shared, not only by large numbers of idealistic
youth who have similarly demonstrated peacefully throughout our nation
in recent years to protest suppression of the rights of Negroes, but also by
some legal scholars and other eminent people.
The court reversed, not because Hallinan's moral convictions
prompted him to act, but because the principle upon which he was
fighting became popular between the time of his actions and when
his denial reached the California Supreme Court. As the court ob-
served: "Whether these activities involve moral turpitude is depend-
ent upon the issues involved and the motivation of the violator."2"
Therefore, unlike one who demonstrates remorse for his actions or
subsequently distances himself from them as Schware did, Hallinan's
views, luckily for him, became popular.
B. Hale
The more recent denial of Matthew Hale's bar application dem-
onstrates how "good moral character" continues to be problematic.
Illinois rejected Matthew Hale, leader of the World Church of the
Creator ("WCOTC"), which argues that Hitler's idea for the superior-
ity of the "white race" should be applied worldwide, not simply to the
German race.12 Hale's predicament drew sharp criticism as well as
16 See Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 421 P.2d 76, 79 n.2 (Cal. 1966) (describing the
grounds whereby Hallinan was denied acceptance due to lack of "good moral character").
l1 Id. at 83.
118 See id. at 85 ("I think somebody in the southern part of the United States has an obliga-
tion ... to disobey some of those laws that are really unconstitutional and that persecute people
on the bases of their race and everything else.").
19 Id. at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
120 Id. at 87. The court continued,
Of course, we do not mean to condone disobedience of the law in any form; we mean
only to express strong doubt that the leaders of current civil rights movements are today
or will in the future be looked upon as persons so lacking in moral qualifications that
they should for that reason alone be prevented from entering their chosen profession.
Id.
I In re Hale, Comm. of Character & Fitness (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), reprinted in GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD ET AL., THE LAw AND ETHICS OF LAWYFRING 875, 876 (3d ed. 1999); see also Anderson v.
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applause as an example of how bar admissions committees success-
fully prevent racists from becoming lawyers. 12 Even George Anasta-
plo incorrectly predicted that Matthew Hale "is likely to be admitted
to the bar fairly soon, just as I would probably be admitted today if I
should apply again"123 because "we have learned, during the past gen-
eration or two, that it is dangerous and otherwise self-defeating to
deny governmental privileges because of the unpopular, even offen-
sive, opinions a citizen might hold.'
124
After Hale passed the Illinois bar exam in 1998, a majority of the
Inquiry Panel of the Character and Fitness Committee declined to
certify him, a decision which the hearing panel upheld, as did the Il-
linois Supreme Court.2 5 Hale petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, which was also denied.2 6  Hale then
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Illinois Character and
Fitness Committee and the Illinois Supreme Court, among others, al-
leging First Amendment, due process and equal protection viola-
tions.2  The court dismissed those claims, without reaching the mer-
its, because of the Rooker-Feldman and preclusion doctrines.
Ultimately, the committee refused to admit Hale because it found
his views of racial superiority offensive and, in particular, his opposi-
tion to the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 9 As the committee described:
Hale, No. 00-C-2021, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3774 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2001) (mentioning, in a
matter unrelated to his bar application, that Montana also declined to admit Hale in late March
2001).
12 See Richard L. Sloane, Barbarian at the Gates: Revisiting the Case of Matthew F Hale To Reaf-
firm That Character and Fitness Evaluations Appropriately Preclude Racists from the Practice of Law, 15
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICs 397 (2002) (determining that by any reasonable definition of "good char-
acter," Matthew Hale failed to meet the standard). But see Mathew Stevenson, Comment, Hate
vs. Hypocrisy: Matt Hale and the New Politics of Bar Admissions, 63 MONT. L. REV. 419 (2002) (con-
cluding that Hale was denied bar admission because of the board's disapproval of his political
views, not because of his moral standing).
1 George Anastaplo, Lawyers, First Principles, and Contemporary Challenges: Explorations, 19 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 353,362 (1999).
14 Id. at 540.
125 In re Hale, Comm. of Character & Fitness (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), reprinted in GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 121, at 875.
126 Hale v. Comm. of Character & Fitness, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) (mem.).
127 Hale v. Comm. of Character & Fitness, 2002 WL 398524, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2002)
(listing defendants and causes of action). See Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2003), providing in part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
128 Hale, 2002 WL 398524, at *3 (holding that lower federal courts lack subject matter juris-
diction to review state court civil decisions and that Hale's claim was precluded by the Supreme
Court's denial of his petition for review).
129 The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
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"Mr. Hale's life mission, the destruction of the Bill of Rights, is inher-
ently incompatible with service as a lawyer or judge who is charged
with safeguarding those rights."3 ° The inquiry panel also distin-
guished Hale's situation from the Baird and Stolar decisions by noting
that neither Sara Baird nor Martin Stolar "[was] actively involved in
inciting racial hatred [or] ... dedicated their lives to destroying
equal rights under law that all American [sic] currently enjoy."'
However, the inquiry panel admitted that Hale and the WCOTC "dis-
avow violence and an intention to seek the forcible overthrow of the
United States Government."'32 Additionally, Hale had "never been





Most importantly, the committee conceded that Hale had "affirm [ed]
that he had the ability and intended to comply with all of the rules
and laws governing the conduct of an attorney, regardless of whether
he agreed or disagreed with such rules and laws." ' This affirmation
is similar to George Anastaplo's gledge. Therefore, there was no real
danger in his speech as a lawyer.
Hale sets a dangerous precedent because under the theory of the
Illinois Supreme Court, if an applicant's wanting to oppose a consti-
tutional amendment is enough to deny bar admission, it would not
be far-fetched to deny bar admission to an applicant who disagrees
with a government policy. As W. Bradley Wendel notes:
Certainly if the basis for exclusion is Hale's advocacy of a principle that is
at odds with then-prevailing law, it is hard to see why this principle can-
not be extended to deny admission to lawyers who believe in the uncon-
stitutionality of the death penalty, the immorality of sodomy statutes, or
the wrongness of Roe v. Wade.'36
Thinking of my own experience before law school, would the fact
that I spent eight months doing paid work opposing the sanctions
against Iraq prevent me from becoming a member of the Illinois Bar,
or any other bar?
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process or law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130 In re Hale, Comm. of Character & Fitness (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), reprinted in GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 121 at 883.
"31 Id. at 880.
1 Id. at 876.
133 Stevenson, supra note 122, at 426.
13 Hale v. Comm. of Character and Fitness, 2002 WL 398524, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2002).
1 Although the committee never said so explicitly, the undercurrent of the decision sug-
gests that the committee regarded Hale's speech as "hate speech," and therefore outside First
Amendment protection.
136 W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 325 (2001).
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During my time with the American Friends Service Committee
(,"AFSC), an international Quaker organization, I actively pro-
moted the organization's "Campaign of Conscience." Begun in De-
cember 1999, the campaign's purpose was to end the U.N. Security
Council's sanctions on Iraq by highlighting their humanitarian im-
pact.13 8  AFSC encouraged individuals to lend moral and financial
support toward the purchase and shipment of water purification
equipment with chlorine filters into Iraq. AFSC illegally shipped the
items because it never received Treasury Department approval for a
license.1 39  By engaging in civil disobedience, AFSC hoped to educate
the public about the lack of potable water in Iraq as well as provide
U.S. citizens with a way to become personally involved in changing
the situation.'4 Although these actions were punishable by jail time
and/or fines, to date no one has been prosecuted.1
4 '
137 AFSC was founded in 1917 and seeks to "understand and address the root causes of pov-
erty, injustice, and war" through nonviolent means. AFSC, AFSC Mission and Values (June 19,
1994), at http://www.afsc.org/about/mission.htm.
13 See AFSC, Campaign of Conscience for the Iraqi People, at http://www.afsc.org/
conscience/default.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
139 Id.
140 The pledge supporters signed read as follows:
Enclosed is my contribution to the Campaign of Conscience for the Iraqi people. I
understand that these funds will be used for this educational campaign and to purchase
humanitarian aid and materials to repair the civilian infrastructure of Iraq.
I support the American Friends Service Committee, the Fellowship of Reconcilia-
tion, and Pax Christi, USA, in expressing their moral commitment to respond to the
humanitarian crisis in Iraq. I understand that the Campaign will apply for licenses to
ship these goods to the people of Iraq, but if denied will ship without licenses, violating
the U.S. sanctions. My contribution might then be interpreted by the U.S. government as
a violation of U.S. law, which provides for civil fines up to $275,000 per violation and
criminal penalties up to $1 million and/or twelve years in prison.
By my contribution, I am publicly associating with the Campaign's effort to end the
economic sanctions against the people of Iraq. I feel morally obligated to help alleviate
the human suffering in Iraq, which is perpetuated by the destruction of Iraq's civilian in-
frastructure: water purification, sewage treatment, and power generation for schools,
hospitals, and homes.
I understand that a copy of this signed statement will be presented by the Campaign
of Conscience to the President, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, U.S. sena-
tors and representatives, and that my name may be used in public statements of support
for the Campaign of Conscience.
AFSC, CAMPAIGN OF CONSCIENCE FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE BROCHURE,
http://www.afsc.org/conscience/brochure2.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
141 In November 2002, the Department of Justice assessed Voices in the Wilderness ("VitW")
with a $20,000 penalty for bringing medicine and school supplies into Iraq. Press Release,
Voices in the Wilderness (Aug. 12, 2003). In September 2003, VitW challenged the fines in dis-
trict court and requested a permanent injunction against the federal government from assess-
ing any fines for the shipment of food, clothing, and medical supplies. Press Release, Voices in




Similar to the applicants in the Communist-era cases, 142 I am ap-
plying to the bar at a time when my views against the war in Iraq are
unpopular.' 43  Finally, unlike applicants such as George Anastaplo,
who only held theoretical beliefs, I acted on my opposition to the
sanctions policy by having it serve as my source of full-time employ-
ment. How this will be treated remains to be seen, as well as whether
or not it would be more of an issue if I were a young man of Arab de-
scent.
144
VI. THE POST-9/11 CLIMATE AGGRAVATES THE ALREADY VAGUE
"GOOD MORAL CHARACTER" STANDARD
The concept of "good moral character" is vague because Supreme
Court decisions, most notably the 1971 trilogy, are inconsistent. The
overall post-9/11 climate further complicates this uncertainty. Before
9/11, character and fitness committees scrutinized applicants' asso-
ciations. Today, during a time in which the government sees internal
opposition as threatening, bar applicants are at an even greater risk
of rejection due to their activities. "5 For example, the PATRIOT Act
ambiguously defines "domestic terrorism."46 Therefore, the vague-
142 See supra Part II.
143 According to polls by USA Today/CNN/ Gallup in April 2004, 48% of Americans approve
of the way President Bush is handling the situation in Iraq. This is an almost 30% decline from
April 2003, at the start of the war, when 76% of Americans approved of Bush's handling of the
situation in Iraq. Campaign 2004 Polls, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/
nation/ polls/usatodaypolls.htm.
144 This may also be treated differently because it was three years ago rather than during my
last year of law school. On the other hand, whether this will become more of an issue in light of
other activities, such as my involvement as a plaintiff in the litigation against Donald Rumsfeld,
is unclear. See Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497JF (E.D. Pa. filed Oct. 1, 2003) (on file with
author) (arguing that the Department of Defense's threat to withhold millions of dollars in
funding because the University of Pennsylvania Law School refuses to allow military recruiters
on campus violates Penn Law faculty and students' First Amendment rights and requesting de-
claratory and any other relief).
145 The government is now more closely watching antiwar protestors. See Eric Lichtblau,
F.B.I. Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 2003, at Al (reporting that in October
2003, the FBI sent a memo to local law enforcement agencies to monitor the activities of war
protestors and to report suspicious activities to its counterterrorism bureau); Ryan J. Foley, Iowa
University Ordered To Turn over Records on Activists, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 8, 2004, at A20 (describ-
ing a federal subpoena to Drake University to hand over records of an anti-war gathering at the
school as well as any observations campus security made of the meeting). For examples of how
nongovernment entities have treated speech critical of the government, see Main R. Scordato
& Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales After September I1th: The First Amendment in Post-World
Trade Center America, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 186 (2002), which discusses the professional
consequences to newspaper writers, a professor, and a television personality after their "unpa-
triotic" remarks surrounding the events of September 11 or for their critiques of President
Bush's behavior in the midst of the attacks.
146 USA PATRIOT Act § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2001); see also infra text accompanying note
161.
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ness of "good moral character" may not only lead to more rejections
in the post-9/11 world, but may chill speech as well as activities.
A. Good Moral Character: A Vague Concept
"Good moral character" is an unconstitutionally vague concept
under the First Amendment because it allows for arbitrary decision
making, and provides no notice to applicants for what qualifies as ac-
ceptable or unacceptable behavior. Therefore, it is even more vul-
nerable to viewpoint-based discrimination in the post-9/11 climate,
which will, in turn, lead to a chilling of applicants' First Amendment
rights.
Good moral character varies depending on how each state's char-
acter and fitness committee characterizes it, a body that in most states
is composed of the applicant's future competitors. As Justice Black
noted: "It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for
any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and
prejudices of the definer."4 7 Such a dangerously subjective notion is
reminiscent of Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it"'" definition
of pornography. Despite this subjectivity, the Supreme Court has re-
jected due process challenges to the good moral character require-
ment.
149
"Good moral character" also fails to notify applicants what kind of
behavior qualifies as "good" versus "unacceptable." As Justice Mar-
shall remarked in Grayned v. Rockford "Uncertain meanings inevitably
lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone". . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.""'5 Even if
law students know that character and fitness committees scrutinize
their lives, this still provides no indication or notice of exactly what is
considered to be a problem. As a result, the Supreme Court aptly ob-
served in In re Stolar "Law students who know they must survive this
screening process before practicing their profession are encouraged
to protect their future by shunning unpopular or controversial or-
ganizations."9 ' Therefore, rather than simply adjusting or avoiding
certain kinds of "unacceptable" behavior, cautious applicants shun a
wider range of activities. As Deborah L. Rhode found: "[A] third of
the respondents in one law student survey reportedly had refrained
147 Konigsberg, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).
148 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
149 See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971)
(holding that the New York Bar's "character and general fitness" requirement does not violate
the U.S. Constitution).
150 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))).
151 In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 28 (1971).
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from certain activities because of the impending character review.
Among the activities cited were attending political rallies, signing pe-
titions, and seeking an Army deferment on psychological grounds."
1 5 2
Rhode conducted her study in the early 1980s. In the post-9/l1 cli-
mate, it seems likely that applicants will be even more apt to steer
away from controversial activities and causes.
Alternatively, the political climate in the country might have no
outward effect on the bar admissions process in terms of denials, but
may simply discourage those with "unpopular" viewpoints from enter-
ing law school or the legal profession, or certain kinds of applicants
may simply avoid practicing in certain states such as Illinois.' Think-
ing of myself, will it be a problem that the human rights center where
I worked in Northern Ireland was housed in a building occupied by
an Irish Republican Army ("IRA") ex-prisoners group?5
The Court has dismissed possible chilling effects on prospective
applicants by claiming that interrogation into associations is con-
ducted in private and if such arbitrary decisions were to be made, the
applicant is afforded the right to appeal. However, a procedural
right means little if there is no substantive guarantee. Furthermore,
privacy protections are lost when an applicant must appeal publicly.
56
When placed in the wrong hands, "good moral character" pro-
vides a weapon for character and fitness committees to arbitrarily ex-
clude those felt to be "undesirable." Such an amorphous concept be-
comes even more dangerous in a post-9/11 world. As an alternative,
committees should measure and name the actual qualities that they
seek-responsibility in financial dealings, honesty, etc.-rather than
using the "unusually ambiguous,"'57 catchall phrase, "good moral
character."
B. How 9/11 and the PATRIOT Act Feed Into the Vagueness
In the context of a process that is characterized by the vague
"good moral character" standard, it is possible that the post-9/11 cli-
mate, especially with the PATRIOT Act, will lead to further restric-
152 Rhode, supra note 10, at 569.
153 Illinois rejected Clyde Summers, George Anastaplo, and Matthew Hale. See In re Sum-
mers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); infra Part VII.C; In reAnastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); supra Part II.C;
Anderson v. Hale, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3774 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2001); supra Part V.B.
15 This fact may be treated somewhat differently now, as the IRA has been on cease-fire since
1994 and I worked in Ireland in 1999. Perhaps if I had applied for bar admission in the 1980s
or if the IRA were currently on the government's list of "terrorist" organizations, it would be a
different matter.
155 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1961).
1 See id. at 73 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court fails to take into account the fact that
judicial review widens the publicity of the [interrogations] ...
157 Konigsbergl, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1956).
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tions on applicants' associations. To date, the incursions into privacy
and civil liberties since 9/11 have primarily focused on aliens and
immigrants, rather than United States citizens. However, in criticiz-
ing INS detentions of immigrants and aliens, David Cole, George-
town Law professor and volunteer attorney for the Center for Consti-
tutional Rights, has warned that "what we do to aliens today provides
a precedent for what can and will be done to citizens tomorrow.
1 58
As evidence he notes that "[t]he McCarthy era of the 1940s and '50s,
in which thousands of Americans were tarred with guilt by associa-
tion, was simply an extension to citizens of a similar campaign using
similar techniques against alien radicals in the first Red Scare thirty•- ,159
years earlier.
Furthermore, although a bar committee may not inquire into an
applicant's associations, it is still free to ask whether an applicant is a
member of the Communist Party,16' arguably leaving the committee
free to change the designated group to fit the times. Section 802 of
the PATRIOT Act creates a federal crime of "domestic terrorism," de-
fined as "acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws" if they "appear to be intended.., to influence the pol-
icy of a government by intimidation or coercion," and if they "occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' As
Nancy Chang, attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights ex-
plains,
Because this crime is couched in such vague and expansive terms, it may
well be read by federal law enforcement agencies as licensing the investi-
gation and surveillance of political activists and organizations based on
their opposition to government policies. It also may be read by prosecu-
tors as licensing the criminalization of legitimate political dissent.
6 2
Therefore, given that character and fitness committees previously
scrutinized applicants' associations, it would not be surprising if there
was a return to these tactics post-9/1 1.
On the other hand, even those like Floyd Abrams, who see the
need for greater government intrusion post-9/11, view First Amend-
Im David Cole, Enemy Aliens and American Freedoms: Experience Teaches Us That Whatever the
Threat, Certain Principles Are Sacrosanct, NATION, Sept 23, 2002, at 20, 22.
159 Id.
160 See In reAnastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 83-85 (1961); Konigsberg , 353 U.S. at 270 (concluding
that membership in the Communist Party alone is an insufficient ground for denying bar mem-
bership); see also The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 217 (1971) (discussing Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971), and character inves-
tigations for bar admissions; noting that "five Justices found inquiry into Communist Party af-
filiation unobjectionable").
161 USA PATRIOT Act § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2001).
162 Nancy Chang, The USA PATRIOT Act: What's So Patriotic About Trampling on the Bill of




ment freedoms as off limits. Abrams believes that in a post-9/11
world, "we must... be prepared to yield some of our privacy, to ac-
cept a higher level of surveillance of our conduct, even to risk some
level of confrontation with the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. '1 63 Nevertheless, he makes an exception for the
First Amendment stating,
One thing I am not prepared to even begin to compromise about is
the First Amendment. In fact, as we give the government more power, it
is all the more important that the press be utterly free to criticize the
manner in which the government exercises that power and (more con-
troversially) to be knowledgeable about what the government has
done....
That is why we must continue to resist every effort of the Administra-
tion to characterize dissent as treason.164
Whether character and fitness committees will tar applicants with the
guilt by association standard used in the communist-era cases or
whether they will instead protect applicants' First Amendment rights,
as Floyd Abrams argues, remains to be seen.
C. Zachary Sanders: A Post-9/11 Example
65
The case of Zachary Sanders demonstrates that the denial of ad-
mission to the bar due to political views is especially relevant today,
with the heightened unpopularity of certain views in the current "war
on terrorism" and the ideologies that espouse it. In September 2003,
the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the character and fitness
committee's denial of Zachary Sanders, a graduate of Yeshiva Univer-
sity's Benjamin Cardozo School of Law. 166 The exact reason for Sand-
ers's denial is unclear because there is a mix of controversial politics
and dishonesty. Sanders believes his three trips to Cuba and opposi-
tion to the United States foreign policy relating to Cuba cost him
admission. While this can not be entirely discounted, it is difficult to
gauge how much his deceit regarding his Cuba trips colored his
163 Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment and the War Against Terrorism, Irving R. Segal Lec-
ture in Trial Advocacy at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Sept. 23, 2002), in 5 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1, 5-6 (2002). The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
164 Abrams, supra note 163, at 8.
165 This discussion is severely limited by the fact that In the Matter of Zachary Sanders, No.
55242, is a signed order rather than a published opinion.
16 See generally Tim O'Brien, Cuba Trips, Cigars Sink Bar Applicant, N.J. L.J., Sept. 8, 2003, at
15. Sanders was admitted in New York in 2001. Id.
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overall application. Lying and deliberate omissions during the bar
admissions process is a near automatic grounds for denial.
6
1
Sanders claims that his three trips to Cuba were acts of civil dis-
obedience. As he explained in his appeal to the NewJersey Supreme
Court after the committee recommended his denial: "A healthy re-
spect for the rule of law, and one's duty to comply with it as an officer
of the Court, does not prevent one from engaging in civil disobedi-
ence. "1'8 Sanders then specifically noted "injustices codified in law,
such as 'slavery, Jim Crow segregation, the Japanese internment
camps, and the displacement of Native Americans."" 69
However, Sanders not only failed to disclose his trips to customs
officials, but only admitted the trips after a search of his bags revealed
cigars. 17 In response, Committee Chair Robert Ritter noted: "Law-
yers, in particular, cannot choose which laws they will violate because
of political beliefs."'71
Sanders's attitude toward the committee also cannot be dis-
counted. Ritter found Sanders's behavior "unremorseful and com-
bative," 72 reminiscent of Raphael Konigsberg and George Anastaplo.
In his rebuttal brief, John Janasie, First Assistant Ethics Counsel with
the Office of Attorney Ethics, noted that Sanders's "intemperate ex-
change" 173 with the committee demonstrated that Sanders "lacks ap-
preciation for the need for 'ordinary civility and common decency' as
'essential for the justice system to run evenly. ' 174
Although Sanders alleges his trips were acts of civil disobedience,
such an act should spring out of moral conviction, not convenience.
The purpose of civil disobedience is to publicly highlight the immoral-
ity of a law. 175 If Sanders truly believed he was acting in an effort to
highlight the immorality of the law, he had ample time and several
opportunities to disclose any one of his three trips to Customs offi-
cials. Instead, upon reentry in the United States after each trip,
Sanders did not disclose his trip to Cuba, he hid cigars, and after the
167 See, e.g., In re E.L.D, 494 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. 1998) (denying admission to an applicant who
gave false and misleading information to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants,
Georgia's character and fitness committee).
168 O'Brien, supra note 166, at 14.
169 Id. (quoting Sanders brief).
170 Id. at 15.




175 Black's Law Dictionary defines civil disobedience as "[a] deliberate but nonviolent act of
lawbreaking to call attention to a particular law or set of laws of questionable legitimacy or mo-
rality." BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 239 (7th ed. 1999).
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U.S. Treasury inquired about Sanders's first trip, he did not answer,
resulting in a $10,000 fine.Y
Ultimately, Sanders demonstrates why clear standards are needed
because it is not apparent why he was rejected. Some may argue
Sanders's case is another example of a bar applicant being denied
because he espouses controversial political views, especially views
critical of U.S. foreign policy after 9/11. If this is true, more denials
are likely. On the other hand, Sanders's lack of candor cannot be
dismissed. Additionally, his case illustrates how sensitive character
and fitness committees still are regarding an applicant's flippant atti-
tude toward them.
VII. BALANCING AN APPLICANT'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST
THE STATE'S INTERESTS POST-9/11
When a character and fitness committee forces an applicant to
forego exercising her First Amendment rights in order to be admit-
ted to the bar, it imposes an unconstitutional condition on the appli-
cant. Doing so also allows the court to balance the applicant's First
Amendment rights against the interests of the state. Furthermore, if
courts continue this approach, as suggested in Hale, applicants will be
even more at risk in a post-9/11 world.
A. Bar Admission as a Privilege Versus a Right
Assuming arguendo that admission to the bar is a privilege rather
than a right, character and fitness committees cannot impose uncon-
stitutional conditions upon a bar applicant.17 As Kathleen M. Sulli-
176 O'Brien, supra note 166, at 14.
177 At times, the Supreme Court has classified admission to the bar as a "right" rather than a
"privilege"; however, the Court has qualified the definition by noting it was only a right for cer-
tain individuals. For example, in Baird, the Court remarked: "[W]hatever justification may be
offered, a State may not inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of
withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes." Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S.
1, 7 (1971). Nevertheless, it then explained that "[t]he practice of law is not a matter of grace,
but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character." Baird, 401 U.S. at 8
(emphasis added). In Anastaplo, the Court echoed this view: "[A]s with membership in the bar,
the State may withhold a privilege available only to those possessing the requisite qualifications,
. . ." In reAnastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 90 (1961); see also In reAnastaplo, 163 N.E.2d 429, 438 (Ill.
1959) (noting that "the granting of the privilege to practice law in this State is conditioned
upon proof by the applicant of his good moral character, of his general fitness to practice law
and of his good citizenship, and upon the taking of an oath to support the State and Federal
constitutions"); In reApplication of Cassidy, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944) ("Mem-
bership in the Bar is not a right; it is a privilege burdened with the specified statutory conditions
which, as to every proposed new member, must be met at the time of admission."). In this way,
admission to the bar is only a right for people possessing what the character and fitness commit-
tee deems as good moral character. Therefore, applicants with no "controversial views," such as
Sara Baird and Martin Stolar, are afforded a higher standard of protection while those like
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van describes: "The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds
that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold that benefit altogether."'78 In this way, the government
cannot "'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.". 7
As Justice Stewart explained,
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government
may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that in-
fringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially, his interest in
freedom of speech.18
In the same way, the state has the power to decide whom it wishes to
admit into its bar. However, forcing an applicant to reveal her past
political associations or, worse still, suggesting that she never form
them in the first place in order to be admitted to the bar amounts to
an unconstitutional condition.
In defending its rejection of Matthew Hale, the Illinois Committee
on Character and Fitness pointed to public employee speech cases
such as Pickering v. Board of Education, which balance the individual's
right to speak on issues of public concern as a citizen against the
state's interest in providing efficient public services.' 8' Although
those cases discuss the imposition of unconstitutional conditions,
even the committee acknowledged that they were not directly analo-
admission. 2 The committee argued that the state had ang o u s to b a r a  i  i . T h o m t e a est a h t  e h d a
Raphael Konigsberg and George Anastaplo are not. Conversely, it could be argued that admis-
sion to the bar leans more toward being a right than a privilege because an applicant has al-
ready invested three years of effort and money to pursue a law degree and, in the majority of
cases, has also passed the bar exam. But c.f Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 421 P.2d 76, 80
n.3 (Cal. 1966) (noting that disbarring an attorney impinges on a vested property right to main-
tain an established practice, while an applicant seeks merely the privilege of admission to the
bar). As the Supreme Court observed in Greene v. McElroy: "[F]reedom to practice [a] chosen
profession" and "the right to ... follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable govern-
ment interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment."
360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959). Ultimately, describing admission as a privilege rather than a right
gives character and fitness committees more room to arbitrarily deny someone on the basis of
good moral character with no protection afforded to the applicant.
178 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989).
179 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958) (alterration in original)).
SId.
181 In re Hale, Comm. of Character & Fitness (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), reprinted in GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 121 at 880-81 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
182 Id. at 880, n.7. "Public employment cases, unlike bar admission cases, usually arise where
the party seeking relief already holds a governmental position and is not applying for one." Id.
Moreover, although the committee did not acknowledge it, a lawyer is not a state employee in
the same sense a police officer or a public school teacher is. Although the state regulates ad-
mission to the bar, unless a lawyer is government employed, the state does not pay the lawyer's
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interest in protecting itself from someone like Hale whose life mis-
sion is to promote racial superiority. Alternatively, it reasoned that
Hale's denial was supportable even if its decision was held to a strict
scrutiny standard.18 3 Nevertheless, the committee adopted these two
approaches only after acknowledging that the Supreme Court had
not decided a bar admissions case in over twenty-five years. 4 In this
way, Hale illustrates how the Supreme Court's lack of clarity in the
area of First Amendment rights for bar applicants confuses character
and fitness committees.
B. The Balancing Approach and Repercussions Post-9/1 1
If the Court follows the balancing approach it has adopted in pre-
vious cases, and as the committee suggested in Hale, applicants will
be even more vulnerable in a post-9/l1 world. In Konigsberg, Anasta-
plo, and Wadmond, the Court "balanced" the applicant's First
Amendment rights against those of the state to uphold denials of
admission to the state bar.8 5  In doing so, the Court stressed the
state's need to "protect" itself from dangerous lawyers. Not only does
this contravene First Amendment law and impose an unconstitutional
condition on the applicant, but it allows for an accordion-like ap-
proach to fundamental freedoms.
8 6
salary. Furthermore, even though a lawyer's role could be described as a "quasi-public obliga-
tion" because a lawyer's "acts... take on a public quality by virtue of [his or her] power... to
invoke the official apparatus of the state," Wendel, supra note 136, at 375, this situation is still
not sufficiently analogous to the public employee cases the committee mentions.
Political patronage cases also discuss the unconstitutional condition doctrine. However,
those cases speak more to the need to support the party system through political appointments.
In contrast, applicants to the bar do not, by and large, serve one of the two political parties. In
the patronage cases, applicants are fired, hired, or transferred because of how it might chill be-
liefs. For examples of political patronage cases, see O'Hare Truck Serv. Inc. v. City of North-
lake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Brand v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
183 In re Hale, Comm. of Character & Fitness (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), reprinted in GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 121 at 880 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)).
184 Id.
185 Even though the 1971 cases were decided after Brandenburg, there is no discussion of the
immediate sense of danger of the speech. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (strik-
ing down an Ohio law on the grounds that a state may not outlaw speech merely because it ad-
vocates violent political overthrow unless such speech is made to incite or is likely to incite im-
minent lawless action).
186 In some respects, the "good moral character" concept, with its ability to evade definition
and its susceptibility to the prejudices and fears of the time, is similar to the historical inability
to define seditious libel. For a discussion of seditious libel as an "accordion-like concept, ex-
pandable or contractible at the whim of judges" and generally "consist[ing] of criticizing the
government: its form, constitution, officers, laws, symbols, conduct, or policies, and soon," see
LEONARD W. LEw, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION 10 (Harper & Row 1963) (1960).
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Although the state has a right to regulate who may practice before
its courts, character and fitness committees should be regulating
competency, not erecting a barrier to entry based on an applicant's
relinquishment of her First Amendment rights. In Pushinsky, the
West Virginia Board of Law Examiners argued that in balancing the
applicants' First Amendment rights against those of the state, the
state needed to be protected against "subversive attorneys.' 8 7 Dis-
missing the argument out of hand, Justice McGraw noted that the
need was to protect the public against "unqualified and undisciplined
persons," not "subversive attorneys." 88 Instead, he proposed that
membership in or advocacy of groups that encourage the overthrow
of the government by force is a "political philosoph [y] ," and not a
"moral weakness." 89 If, once admitted, an attorney becomes a prob-
lem, disciplinary action or disbarment is always an option. Admitting
a person with controversial or unpopular views will not mean that her
practice of law will be solely concerned with promoting that idea, nor
is it indicative of how she will behave as an attorney. From a practical
standpoint, if an attorney presents frivolous claims, Rule 1 1 sanctions
are available.' 90 Furthermore, attorneys must present their ideas in
the context of the adversarial process and must persuade judges and
juries while maintaining a client base.' 9'
As Justice Black observed in reference to George Anastaplo: "The
legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not
constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to
become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-
fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it."
92
Moreover, this approach is even more dangerous in a post-9/11
world, when the state's need to protect itself is arguably higher. As
society's perceived danger increases, the balance of substantial rele-
vance and the need to protect the public increases, thereby decreas-
ing the value placed on the applicant's free speech and association
rights. As Justice Black noted: "[T] his so-called 'balancing test' ...
means that the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, religion and pe-
tition can be repressed whenever there is a sufficient governmental
interest in doing so." 193 The First Amendment should be able to ex-
:87 Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 266 S.E.2d 444, 450 (W. Va. 1980).
88 Id.
"89 Id.
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
191 SeeAnastaplo, supra note 123, at 366 ("Certainly anyone with any unconventional opinions
has to learn to moderate what he says and does in public if he is to secure clients, persuade ju-
ties, and stay in the good graces ofjudges.").
192 In reAnastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 115-16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 111 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Konigsberg I, 366 U.S. 36, 75 (1961) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing the balancing approach as "necessarily tied to the emphasis particular
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pand and contract over time to incorporate new forms or media of
speech, such as e-mail and the Internet, but that expansion and con-
tracting should not relate to how speech is treated, such as restricting
certain kinds of political speech more in times of war or crisis.
1 94
Although in Baird the Court limited the scope of inquiry and af-
forded some protection to bar applicants, when read in conjunction
with Konigsberg and Schware, the door is still open for committees to
ask about personal beliefs and associations as long as it is done in a
targeted way. In Baird the Court remarked: "[W]hen a State at-
tempts to make inquiries about a person's beliefs or associations, its
power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state
inquiries into these protected areas, as Arizona has engaged in here,
discourage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitu-
tion."95 In Konigsberg and Schware in particular, the Supreme Court
described the state's needs as so high that when the balancing occurs,
bar applicants are inherently disadvantaged. For example, in Konigs-
berg, the Court held that not answering questions a committee deems
to have "substantial relevance to ... qualifications," to be tantamount
to obstructing an investigation, which is adequate grounds for de-
nial.9 6  Additionally, as the Court noted, membership in the Com-




Furthermore, the Court has consistently regarded the state's in-
terests as outweighing those of the individual applicant's First
Amendment rights. As Justice Harlan remarked in Konigsberg II re-
garding the ability of the state to inquire into an applicant's Commu-
nist membership:
[W] e regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the
law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but
also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh
the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory dis-
closure in the circumstances here presented. 
g
9
judges give to competing societal values... . But it is neither natural nor unavoidable in this
country for the fundamental rights of the people to be dependent upon the different emphasis
different judges put upon different values at different times.").
194 For a discussion of the courts' treatment of free speech in times of war, see Eugene Vo-
lokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223
(1996) (highlighting cases brought under wartime speech restrictions, such as the Alien and
Sedition Acts and the 1917 Espionage Acts).
195 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
196 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 44.
197 See id. at 52 ("This Court has long since recognized the legitimacy of a statutory finding
that membership in the Communist Party is not unrelated to the danger of use for such illegal
ends of powers given for limited purposes.").
198 Id. The words "circumstances here presented" could possibly provide a restraint on what
committees can do.
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In the end, balancing is an ad hoc approach that evaluates each
applicant on a case-by-case basis rather than attempting to craft gen-
eral rules for future applicants or future character and fitness com-
mittees, thereby perpetuating the vague standard of good moral
character. Ultimately, the balancing approach hides what the Court
is really doing: sanctioning character and fitness committees' imposi-
tion of an unconstitutional condition. In assessing an applicant's
"good moral character," the state essentially says: "In order to join
the legal profession in our state, prove you were not, and are not
now, part of certain organizations or that you do not hold certain
views. However, if you were formerly part of a controversial organiza-
tion or engaged in activities we disapprove of and now disown them,
you canjoin." For Clyde Summers, this meant renouncing his pacifist
views in order to be an attorney in Illinois, while, in a later Maryland
case, a getaway driver in a bank robbery was admitted for demonstrat-
ing "remorse" for his earlier actions.' This highlights the continu-
ing, broad discrepancies among state admission standards.
C. Summers
In 1945, the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois decision to deny
admission to conscientious objector Clyde Summers.20 Summers re-
fused to swear to uphold the Illinois state constitution because it re-
quired men of his age be part of the state militia.201 As the Illinois
committee explained to Summers:
You eschew the use of force regardless of circumstances but the law
which you profess to embrace and which you teach and would practice is
not an abstraction observed through mutual respect. It is real....
I do not argue against your religious beliefs or your philosophy of
non-violence. My point is merely that your position seems inconsistent
with the obligation of an attorney at law.
Essentially, Summers was "allowed" to be a conscientious objector to
war, but could not hold his beliefs as an attorney. First Amendment
rights were extended to him in his personal life, but not in his profes-
sional one. Ironically, the Illinois Character and Fitness Committee
denied Summers admittance because he rejected force, while other
19 See In re Application of G.L.S., 439 A.2d 1107 (Md. 1982) (admitting a candidate to the
Maryland Bar after he demonstrated remorse and law-abiding behavior for 14 years after driving
the getaway car in a bank robbery).
2W In re Summers, 325 U.S 561 (1945). Although decided in 1945 before the "Communist
cases," In re Summers is still good law.
201 Id. at 569-70.
M Id. at 563-64 & n.3.
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states' committees rejected Anastaplo and Konigsberg because they
feared the men's theoretical support for the use of force or the right
to revolution.
Although the Supreme Court argued that one could not be de-
nied admission to the bar based on religion,0 3 as Justice Black al-
leged, there appears to be no other basis for the decision, other than
the unpopularity of his views, 04 especially since Summers had "never
been convicted for, or charged with, a violation of law."205 Similarly,
Hale was also denied admission for his views. Although these are two
very different cases and very different men, in both, the applicant's
world view, shaped by his religious beliefs, "interfered" with the "cor-
rect" view of the law. 06 The Illinois Character and Fitness Committee
seemed to distinguish between one's religious and political beliefs.
Summers was "allowed" to be a conscientious objector to war, but not
a lawyer, and Hale, who was never jailed for his activities, was not al-
lowed to be an attorney. It is unclear if the committee denied Hale
because his religion was not "traditional" or well-established, or be-
cause he "crossed the line." How admissions committees will treat
applicants with radical Islamic beliefs remains unclear.
CONCLUSION
Although the number of applicants denied admission to the bar
due to their political views is relatively sml, 207duetoth r l a s  laivlysma l , the First Amendment
implications are troublesome and the stakes for the individual appli-
cant are high. Appeal is available for one who is denied admission;
however, this ignores the hardship placed on the applicant who has
invested time and money over the preceding three years in law
school, not to mention the sacrifices beforehand. It also raises pri-
203 The Court stated:
[U] nder our Constitutional system, men could not be excluded from the practice of law,
or indeed from following any other calling, simply because they belong to any of our re-
ligious groups, whether Protestant, Catholic, Quaker or Jewish, assuming it conceivable
that any state of the Union would draw such a religious line.
Id. at 571; see also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) ("Obviously an appli-
cant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a
particular church.").
204 In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 573-74 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The fact that petitioner
measures up to every other requirement for admission to the Bar set by the State demonstrates
beyond doubt that the only reason for his rejection was his religious beliefs.").
205 Id. at 574 (Black, J., dissenting).
206 In disagreeing with the Illinois Character and Fitness Committee, I do not in any way
mean to suggest that I agree or support Matthew Hale's view of the world.
207 See Rhode, supra note 10, at 502 ("[T]he number of individuals formally denied admission
remained minimal.").
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vacy concerns because appealing is a public matter,"°8 unless the ap-
plicant chooses to file anonymously.09 Finally, pointing to the avail-
ability of appeal dismisses the chilling effect on the applicant's First
Amendment rights.
The chilling effect of the "good moral character" standard ulti-
mately affects more than just the bar applicant. Instead of simply dis-
couraging certain kinds of activities, the "good moral character"
standard could discourage certain people from entering law school in
the first place. Consequently, this could lead to a law school popula-
tion of predominantly younger students who have not had as much
time to "practice" their views and, overall, a more homogenized
group within the legal profession. This in turn could influence the
kinds of clients who receive representation, especially criminal de-
fendants. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct provide that
"[a] lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment... except for good
cause,"210 one of the good cause reasons includes a "client or [a] cause
[that] is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-
lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client."
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Furthermore, a lawyer may permissively withdraw from representa-
tion if the representation violates the lawyer's sense of moral norms,
i.e., she finds the client's cause "repugnant" or there is a "fundamen-
tal disagreement. 212 Therefore, the more homogenized the pool of
lawyers becomes, the greater the risk to society that certain kinds of
clients will not have adequate representation.
In a broader sense, the vague "good moral character" interroga-
tion harms more than just the applicant. Society has an interest in
protecting all people's First Amendment rights where "no one is in-
timidated with respect to his beliefs or associations."213 Such thinking
echoes the individual liberty theory of First Amendment: the value of
speech is about individual liberty and equality, not simply measured
in terms of its economic or political value to others. 4
Attempting to ascertain how bar admissions committees will treat
applicants in the post-9/11 world is unclear; from the beginning of
M As Justice Black noted in dissent: "[J]udicial review widens the publicity of the questions
and answers and thus tends further to undercut its first ground." Konigsbeig II, 366 U.S. 36, 73
(1961) (BlackJ. dissenting).
2W Given this fact, my research has been limited to reported cases.
210 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.6.2 (2003) (emphasis added).
21 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.2(c) (2003).
212 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (3) (2003).
213 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 73 (Black, J., dissenting). "It is the interest of all the people in
having a society in which no one is intimidated with respect to his beliefs or associations." Id.
214 As C. Edwin Baker argues: "[P]eople's speech and, more generally, their expressive con-
duct are crucial to their self-identification, to their capacity to change the world, and to their
voluntary interactions, including communicative interactions, with others." C. Edwin Baker,
Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV'. 979, 985 (1997).
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the character requirement for bar admissions, the legal profession
was concerned with its public image. In the end, the shaping of the
bar admissions process will depend on how lawyers view their role
within it, because lawyers themselves comprise the character and fit-
ness committees in most states. In late 2001, Michael B. Keating,
President of the Boston Bar, gave somewhat conflicting remarks re-
garding the issue. He encouraged support for the administration's
policies while warning of the danger such policies may pose to civil
liberties:
Despite the atrocities committed by our enemies, our responsibility as
lawyers, individually and collectively, is to steadfastly preserve and protect
the personal liberties of everyone-as enunciated in our constitutions
and by our courts. Ours may be the watchful eye that will insure that dur-
ing this national crisis, the civil liberties even of the perpetrators and
supporters of these murderous attacks will be protected.
However, he went on to say: "[N]ow is also the time for members of
the legal community-in all the various leadership roles that we have
in our communities-to visibly support our government in its efforts
to rid the world of the threat of terrorism.
216
As W. Bradley Wendel has remarked:
The idea of lawyer exceptionalism-the notion that lawyer[s] have di-
minished expressive liberties because of their relationship with the rule
of law-is even more frightening when you consider that the rule of law
217has not always been protective of the groups you want to protect.
Therefore, in a post-9/11 world, it is more important than ever for
bar admissions committees as well as courts to protect applicants' ex-
ercise of their first amendment rights rather than to succumb to fear
by issuing denial.
215 Michael B. Keating, A Letter from the President of the Boston Bar Association, 9 METRO. CORP.
COUNS. 12, Dec. 2001, at 52.
216 Id.
217 W. Bradley Wendel, "Certain Fundamental Truths" A Dialectic on Negative and Positive Liberty
in Hate-Speech Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 59 (2002).
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